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STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: NATIVE AMERICAN
TRIBES, BIG PHARMA, AND THE
LEGITIMACY OF THEIR ALLIANCE
DANIEL C. KENNEDY †
ABSTRACT
Lost in the cacophony surrounding the debate about high drug
prices is the fundamental principle that pharmaceutical innovation will
not occur without the prospect of outsized returns enabled through
market exclusivity. Biopharmaceutical patents are currently under
siege, subject to challenge both in inter partes review (“IPR”)
proceedings and in Hatch-Waxman actions. These twin assaults
threaten to eliminate the incentives necessary for biotechnological
innovation—particularly for discoveries made upstream in the
innovation pipeline—thus imperiling the development of new drug
therapies. But a fascinating solution has emerged: invoking tribal
immunity to shield pharmaceutical patents from IPR before the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). This serves two critically
important objectives: promoting tribal self-sufficiency, and
encouraging investment in life-saving and life-improving new drugs.
Contractual partnerships between Native American tribes and
pharmaceutical companies not only provide the tribes with a steady
stream of royalty revenue, but also insulate biopharmaceutical patents
from challenge in IPR proceedings through the invocation of longestablished principles of tribal sovereign immunity. This Note is the
first piece of scholarship to comprehensively analyze, and advocate for,
the right to invoke tribal sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2017, the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe (“St. Regis Tribe”)
adopted a Tribal Council Resolution endorsing the creation of a
“‘technology and innovation center for the commercialization of
existing and emerging technologies,’ called the Office of Technology,
Research, and Patents.” 1 Effective September 8, 2017, the St. Regis
Tribe entered into a contractual relationship with Allergan Inc.
(“Allergan”), a biopharmaceutical company. 2 Allergan, pursuant to
the parties’ agreement, assigned to the St. Regis Tribe a portfolio of
patents related to Restasis (collectively, the “Restasis patents”), a
prescription drug for the treatment of dry eye. 3 Allergan also agreed to
pay the St. Regis Tribe $13.75 million immediately, as well as a royalty
of up to $15 million per year until the patents expire in 2024. 4 For its
part, the St. Regis Tribe granted Allergan “an irrevocable, perpetual,
transferable and exclusive license” in the Restasis patents. 5 Allergan
was thus “granted the first right to sue for infringement with respect to
‘Generic Equivalents,’ while the Tribe [was granted] the first right to
sue for infringement unrelated to such Generic Equivalents.” 6
At the time that Allergan assigned the Restasis patents to the St.
Regis Tribe, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) had
instituted inter partes review (“IPR”) of those patents, based on
petitions filed by Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 7 On September 22, 2017,
the St. Regis Tribe asked the PTAB to dismiss the pending IPR
proceedings, arguing that tribal sovereign immunity inoculated those
patents from challenge before the PTAB. 8

1. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, -01128, -01129, 01130, -01131, -01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
2. Id.
3. Id.; the patent numbers for these patents are U.S. Patent Nos. 8,685,930, 8,629,111,
8,642,556, 8,633,162, 8,648,048, and 9,248,191.
4. Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *3, *12.
5. Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
6. Id. The license between the St. Regis Tribe and Allergan states that a “Generic
Equivalent” is “a drug product that requires [Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)] approval
for sale in the United States, including those products covered by an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) for which Allergan’s Restasis product is the listed reference drug.” Id. at
*8.
7. Id. at *1.
8. Id.
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On February 23, 2018, the PTAB instead issued a decision denying
the St. Regis Tribe’s motion to terminate proceedings. 9 It held that
tribal immunity does not apply to IPR proceedings given that such
proceedings were created by statute, and because they are “not the
type of ‘suit’ to which an Indian tribe would traditionally enjoy
immunity under the common law.” 10 The PTAB concluded, moreover,
that the St. Regis Tribe had not identified any statute or controlling
precedent requiring the application of tribal sovereign immunity in
IPR proceedings. 11 In addition, although the panel recognized that
previous PTAB decisions had concluded that state sovereign immunity
could be applied to shield patents from IPR review, it held that these
decisions were distinguishable—a conclusion this Note argues is
erroneous. 12
Following the St. Regis Tribe’s and Allergan’s appeal of the
PTAB’s holding, on July 20, 2018, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion
incorrectly concluding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to
IPRs. 13 The Federal Circuit panel relied primarily on the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina
State Ports Authority (“FMC”), 14 in determining that “[g]enerally,
[sovereign] immunity does not apply where the federal government
acting through an agency engages in an investigative action or pursues
an adjudicatory agency action.” 15 Yet, the panel conceded that, “IPR
is neither clearly a judicial proceeding instituted by a private party nor
clearly an enforcement action brought by the federal government.” 16 It
also acknowledged Supreme Court precedent that sovereign immunity
is applicable during administrative adjudications between private
parties. 17 The panel, however, ultimately determined that “IPR is more
like an agency enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private
party,” and thus concluded that “tribal immunity is not implicated” in
IPR proceedings. 18

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3–6.
Id. at *3 n.4.
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1327–29 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
Mylan, 896 F.3d at 1325.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1326–27.
Id. at 1327.
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But, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s rejection of the applicability
of sovereign immunity, courts and the PTAB have repeatedly allowed
state universities that own and license patents to assert sovereign
immunity from IPRs. 19 Yet, apparently, Native American tribes have
no corresponding right to deploy sovereign immunity to shield their
patents from IPR scrutiny. 20 By drawing such a distinction, the PTAB
and Federal Circuit departed from well-established precedent on the
scope of tribal immunity. As the Supreme Court has made clear, Native
American tribes possess “inherent sovereign authority.” 21 Therefore,
“[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only
where Congress has authorized the suit, or the tribe has waived its
immunity.” 22
Although many have criticized the partnership as a “sham,” 23 the
St. Regis Tribe’s contract with Allergan is a proper exercise of its
sovereign authority, serving both to protect the Restasis patents and to
provide the tribe with a much-needed revenue stream. Moreover, using
tribal sovereign immunity to shield pharmaceutical patents from IPR
scrutiny protects and promotes biotechnological innovation; more
broadly, strong patents—like the Restasis patents—are critically
important in encouraging investment in the development of life-saving
and life-enhancing drug therapies. 24 The costs associated with
biotechnological innovation are high, 25 and allowing tribal immunity to
be used to protect pharmaceutical patents would help to ensure that

19. See, e.g., Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-01914 (P.T.A.B.
July 13, 2017) (holding that Regents of the University of Minnesota could not be compelled to
join the proceeding); NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., No. IPR2016-00208 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017)
(granting the University of Maryland immunity from the proceeding); Covidien LP v. Univ. of
Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, -01276, -01276 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017)
(determining that the University of Florida Research Foundation was entitled to sovereign
immunity as an arm of Florida).
20. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, -01128, -01129,
-01130, -01131, -01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam).
21. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991).
22. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
23. See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL
4619790, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (noting that Allergen’s transactions with the St. Regis
Tribe have circumstances that are “frequently encountered in sham transactions”).
24. See PHRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: THE PROCESS
BEHIND NEW MEDICINES 6 (2015), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/
rd_brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC2G-WG2T] (noting the importance of intellectual property
for pharmaceutical research and development).
25. See id. at 1 (estimating the “average cost to research and develop each successful drug . . .
to be $2.6 billion”).
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the enormous costs associated with new drug development can be
recouped.
Part I of this Note sketches the legal background of IPR
proceedings. Part II discusses the threats facing biopharmaceutical
innovation from IPR proceedings, including IPR petitions brought by
hedge funds. Part III argues that both the Federal Circuit and the
PTAB incorrectly determined that tribal sovereign immunity could not
be used to shield patents owned by the St. Regis Tribe from IPR
challenge. Finally, Part III also contends that sovereign immunity can
and should be used to protect biopharmaceutical patents and to
encourage new investments in drug innovation and development.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IPR AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
This Part provides critical background information on the patent
system and the type of post-grant proceeding at issue in this Note: IPR.
It then provides a primer on the concept of tribal sovereign immunity,
upon which the St. Regis Tribe contends that the Restasis patents are
not subject to IPR review.
A. IPR Challenges
The federal government’s power to issue patents stems from a
constitutional provision that authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . .
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” 26 The Patent
Act of 1790 granted the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and
the Attorney General the authority to examine patent applications and
issue patents. 27 Congress then created the Patent Office in 1836, giving
it broad power to “execute, and perform, all such acts and things
touching and respecting the granting and issuing of patents for new and
useful discoveries, inventions, and improvements.” 28 And in 1952,
Congress provided the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) with the
authority to promulgate rules “for the conduct of proceedings in the
Patent Office.” 29

26.
27.
28.
29.

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10.
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117, 117–18.
Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 6, 66 Stat. 792, 793.
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More recently, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 30 (“AIA”)
was signed into law on September 16, 2011. 31 Put simply, it was the most
significant overhaul of patent law in more than half a century. 32 The
AIA gives the PTO expanded authority to reconsider the patentability
of claims in issued patents. 33 It replaced inter partes reexamination with
IPR, an administrative procedure that allows a third-party challenger34
to petition the PTO to reexamine the claims in an issued patent and to
cancel any claims the agency finds to be unpatentable in light of the
prior art. 35
IPRs proceed in two phases. 36 In the first phase, the PTO
determines whether to institute IPR. 37 In the second phase, the PTAB
conducts the IPR proceeding and issues a final written decision. 38 A
party in an IPR proceeding who is “dissatisfied with the final written
decision of the [PTAB] may appeal the decision” to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 39 Critically, an IPR can be
requested at any point during a patent’s term, beginning nine months
after its issuance. 40 A petition for IPR will be granted by the PTO if the
petitioner can show with “reasonable likelihood” that it will “prevail
with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 41 IPR
proceedings—typically heard before three administrative patent
judges of the PTAB—are conducted on an expedited basis and are
subject to a statutorily imposed requirement that disputes be resolved
within twelve to eighteen months. 42

30. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 28 and 35
U.S.C.).
31. See 157 CONG. REC. D979 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2011) (noting the signing of the AIA into
law).
32. See Clark D. Asay, Patenting Elasticities, 91 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1, 49 (2017) (noting that
“[t]he AIA has been called the most important patent law reform since the 1952 Patent Act”).
33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012).
34. The AIA provides that “a person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the
[PTO] a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.” Id. § 311(a).
35. Id. § 311; Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016).
36. See St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1375–76 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (explaining the IPR process mandated by statute).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
38. Id. § 318(a).
39. Id. § 319; see, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1314–15 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (providing an example of an appealed PTAB decision).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1).
41. Id. § 314(a).
42. Id. § 316(a)(11).
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IPR proceedings differ from district court proceedings in
important ways, and these differences can dramatically increase the
likelihood that a challenger will succeed in invalidating a patent. 43 In
district court litigation, a patent enjoys a presumption of validity, 44 with
clear and convincing evidence required to demonstrate invalidity. 45 By
contrast, a petitioner in an IPR proceeding only carries “the burden of
proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the
evidence.” 46 Moreover, the PTAB applies a broader claimconstruction standard than that which is applied in district courts. In
district court proceedings, the language of a patent claim is given its
“ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the
term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at
the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent
application.” 47 In IPR proceedings, however, the language of a patent
claim is “given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification of the patent in which it appears.” 48 The impact of this
distinction can be profound: a broadly construed claim is far more
likely to be invalidated for infringing upon prior art because the more
generally a claim is constructed, the more likely it is that its specific
novelty will be overlooked. Furthermore, construing identical claims in
different ways, solely based upon the forum, is “troubling, especially
when claim construction takes place at the same time in parallel district
court proceedings and USPTO proceedings.” 49

43. See David Hricik, Will Patenting Make As Much Sense in the New Regime of Weakened
Patent Rights and Shorter Product Life Cycles?, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 457, 489–91 (2017)
(discussing how IPRs have made it easier to challenge patents because the patents do not have a
presumption of validity, claims are given broad interpretations, and litigation can be stayed if an
IPR is instituted).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
45. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
47. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
48. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2017); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–
46 (2016) (affirming the Patent Office’s authority to use the “broadest reasonable construction”
standard in § 42.100(b)).
49. KEVIN GREENLEAF ET AL., INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, HOW DIFFERENT ARE THE
BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION AND PHILLIPS CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
STANDARDS? 3 (July 2018), https://www.ipo.org//wp-content/uploads/2018/07/BRI-v-PhillipsFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3LE-HY9U].
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The costs of challenging a patent are generally much lower at the
PTAB. 50 It is estimated that post-grant-review challenges before the
PTAB “on average cost from $350,000 to $450,000 through any appeal,
whereas patent litigation in federal court is estimated to cost between
$1 [million] and $1.5 million through any appeal for matter[s] in which
$1 [million] to $10 million are at stake.” 51 Where more money is at
stake, the costs associated with challenging a patent in federal court are
even higher. 52
The AIA’s new post-grant proceedings, including IPR, were
designed to be “quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.” 53
One of the motivating policy justifications for enacting the AIA was
the sense that the PTO had granted too many “bad” patents that were
doing little to incentivize innovation, and that were instead being
asserted by so-called “trolls” in an extortionist manner. 54 IPRs were
instead intended to provide “a meaningful opportunity to improve
patent quality and restore confidence in the presumption of validity
that comes with issued patents in court.” 55
IPRs have provided a highly effective avenue for challenging
patents. 56 In fact, petitioners have been so successful in invalidating
patents before the PTAB that Randall Rader, then Chief Judge of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, referred to the PTAB as
a “death squad[] killing property rights.” 57 And the statistics bear this

50. Teague I. Donahey, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and the Supreme Court:
How Oil States Threatens to Reverse Congressional Efforts to Reform Patent Litigation, 60
ADVOCATE 22, 22 (2017).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011), as reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 78
[hereinafter “House Report”].
54. See Asay, supra note 32, at 3 (“From fueling the business models of so-called patent
trolls, to diverting valuable resources into patent ‘wars,’ to otherwise failing to live up to their
purported theoretical justifications, the increasing number of patents flooding the U.S.
marketplace is of growing concern to scholars and policymakers alike.” (citations omitted));
Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents
Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 108–09 (2011) (noting that nearly half of all litigated patents that
make it through trial were eventually invalidated by the courts).
55. House Report, supra note 53, at 48.
56. See Donahey, supra note 50, at 22 (“Over the past five years, parties have been widely
successful at invalidating patents before the PTAB . . . .”).
57. Brian Nolan & Michael Martinez, New Enemy Challenging Biopharma Patents:
Investment Firms, 22 No. 8 WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP. *1, *1 (Aug. 5, 2015); see also Susan
Decker, Apple Likes the ‘Patent Death Squad.’ Allergan Pays to Avoid It, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20,
2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-20/apple-likes-the-patent-
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out: between 2012 and 2017, in instances when the PTAB instituted
IPR review, it found all claims unpatentable in 65 percent of instances
and at least one claim unpatentable in 82 percent of proceedings. 58
A recently published study demonstrates that IPRs pose a very
real threat to biopharmaceutical innovation. On March 13, 2018, the
PTO issued a special report on trial outcomes for pharmaceutical
patents. 59 The report focuses on the “institution rate” metric of how
often a challenged patent gets upheld; it states that “[t]he cumulative
institution rate for [pharmaceutical patent] petitions (66%) is
essentially the same as the cumulative overall institution rate (68%).” 60
Although the PTAB’s institution rate on pharmaceutical patents is
similar to its overall institution rate, in cases where the PTAB issued a
final written decision related to pharmaceutical patents, it found that
none of the challenged claims were patentable in 46 percent of those
cases. 61 This means that if a challenger can convince the PTAB to
review an Orange Book patent, there is a nearly 50 percent chance that
all the challenged claims will ultimately be invalidated.62
Although IPRs may be useful in eliminating low-quality patents in
certain fields, the system, as it is currently structured, fails to recognize
that “[t]echnology is anything but uniform . . . and it displays highly
diverse characteristics across different sectors.” 63 In the
pharmaceutical sector, the IPR system is not only unnecessary, but it
also places potentially catastrophic burdens on the future of new drug
development.
B. A Primer on Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity has been a bedrock principle of our federal
system since the founding: “Although the Constitution establishes a
National Government with broad, often plenary authority over matters

death-squad-allergan-pays-to-avoid-it [https://perma.cc/7R7F-WLNS] (noting that the PTAB has
been “dubbed a ‘death squad’”).
58. Donahey, supra note 50, at 22.
59. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., CHAT WITH THE CHIEF, NEW PTAB STUDIES
IN AIA PROCEEDINGS: EXPANDED PANELS AND TRIAL OUTCOMES FOR ORANGE
PATENTS
(2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
BOOK-LISTED
chat_with_the_chief_march_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/548P-N3XM].
60. Id. at 34.
61. Id. The PTAB found some claims patentable in another 3 percent of cases. Id.
62. Id.
63. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577
(2003).
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within its recognized competence, the founding document ‘specifically
recognizes the States as sovereign entities.’” 64 By its plain terms, the
Eleventh Amendment provides state governments with immunity from
suits brought in federal court by citizens of other states and citizens or
subjects of foreign states. 65 In Hans v. Louisiana, however, the
Supreme Court extended this immunity to preclude all suits against a
state, including those suits brought by citizens of the same state. 66
Unlike state sovereign immunity, which is constitutionally
guaranteed under the Eleventh Amendment, tribal immunity is
grounded in federal common law. 67 In 1919, the Supreme Court
explicitly embraced the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, stating
that tribal governments—like local or state governments—cannot be
sued “for injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or failure
to keep the peace.” 68 In the ensuing years, the Supreme Court made
clear that as “domestic dependent nations,” 69 Indian tribes “exercise
inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories.” 70
Accordingly, although Congress exercises “plenary control” over
them, the tribes maintain their sovereign authority up to the point at
which Congress acts. Furthermore, “[a]lthough Congress has plenary
authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in
fact intends to undermine Indian self-government.” 71 At a base level,
the Supreme Court has asserted that, “[a]mong the core aspects of
sovereignty that tribes possess—subject, again, to congressional
action—is the ‘common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed
by sovereign powers.’” 72 Specifically, this sovereign tribal immunity
applies to suits brought by both states and individuals. 73 And any

64. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 715
U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996)).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
66. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890) (noting that a state can only be sued with its
consent).
67. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998).
68. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357–58 (1919).
69. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
70. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509
(1991).
71. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014).
72. Id. at 2030 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
73. Id. at 2031.
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waiver of sovereign immunity by a tribe must be unequivocally
expressed. 74
There is no blanket prohibition on asserting sovereign immunity
in agency proceedings involving the federal government. 75 But there is
an exemption from sovereign immunity for suits brought by the United
States; however, that exemption only subjects tribes to proceedings
that are “commenced and prosecuted” by the United States. 76 In
general, sovereign immunity applies in agency proceedings when such
proceedings “can indeed be characterized as a lawsuit” in that they
involve adverse parties, examination and cross examination,
deposition discovery, and an impartial federal adjudicator. 77
Tribal sovereign immunity has no exception for commercial
activity, 78 allowing tribes to engage in commerce with corporate
partners without waiving the protections this immunity offers. In
determining whether a commercial entity enjoys the benefits of tribal
immunity, courts look to see whether the entity is an “arm of the
tribe.” 79 In doing so, they consider whether the entity “is chartered
under tribal law, whether its proceeds serve to further the aims of tribal
self-governance, and whether the tribe intended to confer its
immunity.” 80 Casinos and other businesses on reservations routinely
receive this protection. 81 And significantly, Allergan and the St. Regis
Tribe structured their contract in such a way that their partnership has
never been challenged under this test.
II. IPRS: AN IMPROPER FORUM FOR REVIEW OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTS
The costs and difficulties associated with drug development, the
vital importance of patents to the pharmaceutical industry—especially
74. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)
(“[T]o relinquish its immunity, a tribe’s waiver must be ‘clear.’” (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n, 498
U.S. at 509)).
75. See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc, 896 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“There is not, however, a blanket rule that immunity does not apply in federal agency
proceedings.” (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754–56 (2002))).
76. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
77. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
78. Gregory Ablavsky, Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Patent Law, LEGAL AGGREGATE
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/2017/09/13/tribal-sovereign-immunity-and-patent-law
[https://perma.cc/UP4U-9Y3A].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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early in the innovation pipeline—and the already successful, but
delicate, legislative framework allowing generic entry into the market,
all make IPR the improper forum to review pharmaceutical patents.
A. The Nature of Drug Development
Strong patents have been described as the “lifeblood of the
biotechnology industry,” 82 and with good reason. The costs associated
with innovation in the biotechnology realm are typically far higher than
in other fields, 83 in part because “of the labyrinthine regulatory process
and the detailed study that is required to sell a drug for consumption
by humans.” 84 In 2014, it cost drug manufacturers an estimated average
of $2.6 billion to bring a new drug to market. 85 This “is based on an
average out-of-pocket cost of $1.4 billion and an estimate of $1.2 billion
in returns that investors forego” during the decade the drug is in
development. 86
Before marketing a new drug to the public, pharmaceutical
companies must first obtain approval from the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”). 87 The FDA approval process requires timeconsuming and expensive clinical testing, typically including “three
phases of human trials designed to test whether a drug is safe and
effective for general public consumption.” 88 Furthermore, much of the
“low-hanging fruit”—the relatively easy-to-develop molecules for
which there is great demand—has already been picked, forcing firms
to “focus their R&D [research and development] where the science is
difficult and the failure risks are higher.” 89 Consequently, the practice
of creating new medicines “is growing in difficulty and length” as well
as in expense. 90 It typically takes at least a decade to bring a potentially

82. Sommer Nicole Louie, The Inadequacy of Bankruptcy Protection for the Biotechnology
Industry, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 337, 339 (2005) (citation omitted).
83. Burk & Lemley, supra note 63, at 1581–82.
84. Id.
85. Rick Mullin, Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5B, SCI. AM.
(Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-to-develop-new-pharmaceuticaldrug-now-exceeds-2-5b [https://perma.cc/3BW9-HL56].
86. Id.
87. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
88. Caitlyn Martin, Questioning the “Right” in State Right to Try Laws: Assessing the Legality
and Effectiveness of These Laws, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 159, 168 (2016).
89. PHRMA, supra note 24, at 1.
90. Id.
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therapeutic discovery from its nascent stage to the market, “with
clinical trials alone taking six to seven years on average.” 91
The apparent purpose of IPRs is to rid the system of useless
patents writ large. But even the most suspect component of any drug
from a patentability perspective has already had to prove its safety and
efficacy to the FDA to a greater extent than the most comprehensive
PTO review could require: less than 12 percent of drugs survive clinical
testing, and thousands more never advance beyond the in vitro stage of
testing. 92 Because FDA-approved pharmaceutical components have all
been so thoroughly vetted by that industry, and because the FDA
process guarantees that the component is functional, allowing these
patents to be retroactively invalidated is particularly unfair.
Producing any first-in-class drug, like Restasis, requires “the best
scientific minds, highly sophisticated technologies, ever-evolving
manufacturing processes, and complex project management.” 93
Developing a lucrative drug requires dogged persistence through
scores of failures, but in the end, the drug “brings hope and relief to
millions of patients.” 94 At bottom, it is estimated that new drug
discoveries accounted for 40 percent of the increase in American
lifespan between 1986 and 2000. 95
However, the “best scientific minds” can no longer be certain they
will be rewarded for their discoveries, even in a field where discovery
has provided more life-saving benefits than almost any other.
Presumably, the best and brightest should continue to be encouraged
to enter the pharma-innovation field and provide society with
breakthrough therapies like penicillin or the polio vaccine. But myriad
environmental factors are not providing these pharmaceutical
innovators with effective incentives. “[T]he unprecedented
combination of reduced R&D output in the form of successfully
launched truly innovative” new molecular entities, together with
reduced market exclusivity and massive revenue loss from generic
competitors, “suggest[s] that we may be moving closer to a
pharmaceutical ‘ice age’ and the potential extinction of the industry.” 96

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s
Grand Challenge, 9 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 204 (2010).
96. Id.
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According to one estimate, for every dollar of profit that branded
pharmaceuticals miss out on because of patent expirations, they only
recoup twenty-six cents through the sale of new products. 97 Thus, in the
absence of a massive boost in productivity, branded pharmaceuticals
simply “cannot sustain sufficient innovation to replace the loss of
revenues due to patent expirations for successful products.” 98
B. The Critical Role of Patents in Drug Development
Given the enormous amount of money and time it takes to bring
a new drug to market, the financial rewards of patent protection are of
paramount importance to the pharmaceutical sector. Investment in the
biotech space “is predicated on an expected return in the form of
patent-protected products or services that ultimately reach the
market.” 99 Furthermore, “biotech companies often rely on just a
handful of highly valuable patents to protect their products and
massive investment therein.” 100 Even compared to other industries that
rely heavily on research and development (“R&D”), biotechnology
companies spend a far greater share of their resources on R&D. 101 In
the chemical industry, for example, “the ratio of R&D expenditure to
total revenues is approximately 5%,” but in the biotechnology arena,
companies tend to plow between 40 and 50 percent of their revenues
back into R&D. 102
Moreover, while it is incredibly expensive to bring new drugs to
market, it is quite cheap to imitate them. 103 Compared to the billions
that pharmaceutical companies are forced to spend to develop first-inclass drugs, it typically costs generics only $1 million to $2 million to
gain FDA approval, based on a study in the year 2000. 104 This is
because the present reality in drug development is that “[a]lmost any
97. Id. at 203.
98. Id.
99. The Impact of Abusive Patent Litigation Practices on the American Economy: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3–4 (2015) (Statement of Hans Sauer, Deputy
General Counsel for Intellectual Property, Biotechnology Industry Association) [hereinafter
Sauer Testimony].
100. Id. at 18.
101. Esteban Burrone, Patents at the Core: The Biotech Business, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG.
(2006),
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/patents_biotech_fulltext.html#P4_83
[https://perma.cc/5YMN-GW42].
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and
Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 7, 13 (2003).
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technology or compound can rapidly be reverse engineered,” 105 making
strong intellectual property protection the most significant motivation
that companies have to invent new drugs.
An important—but often overlooked—factor in the debate
surrounding high drug prices is that, for many biotech companies,
“intellectual property rights are actually the final product.” 106 Because
such companies lack the resources to bring their drugs to market, many
firms either license out their patents to, or are acquired by, larger
companies. 107 The profound implications of this are poorly addressed
in the popular discourse surrounding big pharma and rising drug costs.
Instead, the pharmaceutical industry is broadly criticized for reaping
huge profits at the expense of public health, and it “comes only second
to the federal government as the public’s least-favored industry.” 108
Consequently, attempting to defend the industry, much less expand its
protections, is not a popular position to take.
However, unbeknownst to most casual observers, the lion’s share
of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry does not occur within
large companies. 109 Smaller companies, often funded by venture
capitalist (“VC”) investors, direct nearly 90 percent of their funding in
the space into novel drug R&D—research focused on diseases with an
unmet medical need. 110 This stands in stark contrast to the “low
technical risk” investment model prominent at many large

105. Why Patents are the Lifeblood of Biotech Companies, BIOSPACE (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.biospace.com/article/around-the-web/why-patents-are-the-lifeblood-of-biotechcompanies- [https://perma.cc/83TU-CN3F].
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Ashley E. Petrarca, Note, Allergan’s Battle to Stay in Court: Does Inter Partes Review
Violate the Constitution by Circumventing Courtroom Adjudication?, B.C. INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. F. 1, 1 (Dec. 20, 2017); Peter Loftus, Drugmakers Raise Prices Despite Criticisms, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2016, 8:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/drugmakers-raise-prices-despitecriticisms-1452474210 [https://perma.cc/3CBL-JNMR] (noting that high drug prices mean that
certain patients will be denied access to life-saving drugs).
109. Cf. THE BUSINESS OF HEALTHCARE INNOVATION 148 (Lawton Burns ed., 2d ed. 2012)
(“While larger firms may (or may not) undertake the bulk of innovative investment, they are not
the source of the majority of innovations, or at least the most distinctive innovations in a
therapeutic area.”).
110. David Thomas & Chad Wessel, Emerging Therapeutic Company Investment and Deal
Trends, BIO INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 9 (June 1, 2017), https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/
BIO%20Emerging%20Therapeutic%20Company%20Report%202007-2016.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/BHH5-SBMC] (“The majority of the venture funding continues to flow into novel drug
R&D, reaching a peak of 92% in 2015 and down slightly to 83% in 2016.”).
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pharmaceutical firms. 111 By and large, VCs are professional investors,
not scientists. Accordingly, in this knowledge-intensive industry,
“emerging firms that seek external financ[ing] can be difficult to”
value. 112 Patents provide an important signaling function to VCs, and
they are a useful heuristic for these investors in making their
valuations. Studies have documented “that patents attract prominent
VC[]s, prompt VC[]s to invest faster and generally increase the
amounts” they invest. 113 In essence, many VCs rely on the PTO in
making their investment decisions—particularly in early rounds of
funding, 114 where the majority of funding “has gone toward early stage
assets” 115 like drug discovery, among the furthest upstream research in
the innovation pipeline. This is significant because “discovery research
and early translational medicine” are the most significant factors in
producing “highly innovative medicines that result in markedly
improved health outcomes.” 116 Further, it is in these early rounds that
VCs rely most heavily on the PTO’s grant of a patent. Unfortunately,
many feel they can no longer do so. 117
In 1996, the United States financed 83 percent of the world’s
venture capital. 118 But by 2015, its market share had been reduced to
54 percent. 119 As investment in the space continues to decrease, the
“US should be working to improve its innovation ecosystem, providing
stable and effective property rights,” especially intellectual property
rights, “so that VCs can once again feel confident” in their

111. Bruce Booth, Where Does All That Biotech Venture Capital Go?, LIFESCIVC (Feb. 9,
2015),
https://lifescivc.com/2015/02/where-does-all-that-biotech-venture-capital-go
[https://
perma.cc/WPY7-QDVS].
112. Sebastian Hoenen, Christos Kolympiris, Wilfred Schoenmakers & Nicholas
Kalaitzandonakes, The Diminishing Signaling Value of Patents Between Early Rounds of Venture
Capital Financing, 43 RES. POL’Y 956, 956 (2014).
113. Id. at 957.
114. Eric K. Steffe & Timothy J. Shea, Jr., Protecting Innovation in Biotechnology Startups,
NATURE: BIOENTREPRENEUR (June 23, 2003), https://www.nature.com/bioent/2003/030601/full/
bioent741.html [https://perma.cc/YF9Z-VUC3].
115. Booth, supra note 111.
116. Paul, supra note 95, at 213.
117. See Kevin Madigan, As Investment Moves Overseas, The US Must Restore Its GoldStandard Patent System, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (June 22, 2017),
https://cpip.gmu.edu/2017/06/22/as-investment-moves-overseas-the-us-must-restore-its-goldstandard-patent-system [https://perma.cc/86L7-B3TL] (explaining how the weakening of patent
rights is a factor causing venture capital investment to decline in the United States and move
overseas).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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investments. 120 However, the American intellectual property regime is
“doing just the opposite.” 121 For this reason, especially in the researchintensive biotechnology sector where strong patents are “absolutely
vital,” investment has been flowing out of American firms and into
Chinese ones at an alarming rate. This trend could soon allow China to
take the lead “in the development of lifesaving therapeutics and cancer
treatment drugs.” 122
Research suggests that possessing patents is among the most
significant factors in securing early stage venture funding in the life
sciences industry. 123 This makes sense, as “[v]ery few biotechnology
startups actually have products to sell; their primary assets are usually
proprietary technologies”—that is, these companies’ value is usually
directly tied to their ability to safeguard their innovations through
patent protection. 124 For this reason, many VCs hire patent consultants
to assess the strength of a company’s patent portfolio before making
an investment. 125
But the IPR “death squad[]” of the PTAB is increasingly
undermining the confidence VCs can place in biotech patents. 126 This
is problematic because VC investing is risky enough to begin with: the
majority of venture capital funds do not break even, 127 and around 75
percent of the companies they invest in fail outright. 128 To turn a profit,
VCs need to hit a home run on a small portion of their investments,
and in doing so, make up for their high number of strikeouts, which are
especially expensive in the pharmaceutical industry. But who would
swing for the fences on every pitch, given that the umpire—the
PTAB—can far too easily “invalidate” any pharmaceutical home run?
Put simply, according to a letter signed by some of the nation’s top
VCs, “the injection of this type of [IPR] uncertainty into the patent
system puts in doubt [our] future funding of” the life sciences sector
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Steffe & Shea, supra note 114 (noting that “a strong patent position is a crucial
ingredient for successfully raising venture capital”).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Nolan & Martinez, supra note 57, at *1.
127. Diane Mulcahy, Six Myths About Venture Capitalists, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/05/six-myths-about-venture-capitalists [https://perma.cc/6HVW-KN92].
128. Max Nisen, Bill Gates Says the Success Rate on Venture Capital Is “Pathetic” Compared
to Development, QUARTZ (Mar. 14, 2014), https://qz.com/187959/bill-gates-says-the-success-rateon-venture-capital-is-pathetic-compared-to-development [https://perma.cc/6SBE-ASXJ].
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because “no matter how groundbreaking an innovation may be,
without the guarantee of a strong patent, the risk cannot be
justified.” 129
It could be argued that the pharmaceutical patents challenged in
IPR proceedings are not the same sort of patents that VCs rely on in
making their investment decisions. Instead, so the reasoning goes, the
challenged patents are the so-called “evergreening” patents, 130
obtained by large pharmaceutical firms after a drug has been launched.
Such “secondary” patents pertain to “ancillary aspects of drug
innovation,” such as formulations and compositions, as opposed to
active ingredients. 131 The data on Orange Book-related patents in IPR
proceedings has not been broken down into active-ingredient patents
and secondary patents, but in district court proceedings, secondary
patents are the subject of a greater proportion of preexpiration
challenges, where they are invalidated at higher rates than active
ingredient patents. 132 Even assuming, arguendo, that secondary patents
make up the lion’s share of patents in IPR proceedings, and assuming
that these secondary patents are obtained after the venture funding
stage, it does not necessarily follow that the invalidation of secondary
patents will have a de minimis impact on upstream innovation.
Importantly, if large pharmaceutical companies are unable to extend
the patent-protected life of their blockbuster drugs by relying on
secondary patents, they will be less likely to acquire active-ingredient
patents from venture-backed companies in the first place. Because of
the “current pressures on existing patents and the uncertain[] future of
pharmaceutical patent protection . . . an unintended downward
129. Letter from Members of Life Sciences Venture Capital Community to Chuck Grassley,
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, John Conyers,
Ranking Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 9, 2015), https://califesciences.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/VC-Letter-on-IPR-Reform-H-R-9_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6PHC-5WA5].
130. See Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable? A Comparative Perspective, 17
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 297 (2015):
In recent years, companies are increasingly seeking and obtaining a series of patents
on different aspects of a drug, with each patent having a later expiration date to
effectively result in a longer period of market exclusivity. Critics call this
“evergreening,” in that the patent term appears “evergreen,” even if the commercial
exclusivity is technically achieved through different patents.
131. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court,
339 SCIENCE 1386, 1386 (2013).
132. See id. at 1386–87 (“Of . . . cases litigated to completion . . . the branded firm nearly
always wins a suit asserting an active ingredient patent . . . but usually loses asserting secondary
patents . . . .”).
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pressure [is being applied] on the incentives to undertake the most
risky research,” 133 which is typically sponsored by VCs. If VCs
conclude that a drug being developed by a small life sciences firm is
unlikely to be acquired or that it will be acquired at a lower multiple
than the economics of VC firms demand, the incentives for investment
are sharply curtailed. An understanding of the dynamics of upstream
innovation requires that “patent incentives . . . promise more than
reasonable compensation for R&D effort.” 134 Instead, financing
incredibly risky and potentially life-saving R&D must promise “great
rewards for great advancements that will not be retroactively
appropriated” by the PTO. 135
Oddly enough, and unfortunately, “[t]here’s more money to be
made investing in drugs that will extend cancer patients’ lives by a few
months than in drugs that would prevent cancer in the first place.” 136
Eric Budish, Benjamin Roin, and Heidi Williams effectively show why
our patent system may have historically encouraged this problem by
demonstrating that a drug’s commercial success is often inversely
correlated with the time it takes to develop and its therapeutic value. 137
And IPRs stand to make this problem worse. Drug patents are granted
by the PTO well before the FDA approves the sale of actual drugs.
Before granting approval, the FDA requires years of clinical testing to
show that the drugs are safe and effective. 138 While all drugs require
these trials, drugs that attack diseases in their later stages, such as
chemotherapeutics, tend to take proportionately less time to
demonstrate safety and efficacy. This is because diseases in later stages
tend to progress much more rapidly and aggressively, allowing firms to
see any drug-related effects—even if insignificant—in much less
time. 139 This rapidity of observable results allows late stage drugs to

133. Daniel R. Cahoy, Rethinking Patents for Optimal Health Care Innovation, at 87 (Apr.
2005) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.smeal.psu.edu/fcfe/research/white/patents.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M75L-AV2R].
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Austin Frakt, Why Preventing Cancer Is Not the Priority in Drug Development, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/upshot/why-preventing-cancer-isnot-the-priority-in-drug-development.html [https://perma.cc/G2ZA-MN7J].
137. See generally Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest
in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044 (2015)
(analyzing how private investment shapes cancer research).
138. See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
139. Frakt, supra note 136.
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obtain FDA approval faster and get to market sooner. 140 Accordingly,
late-stage drugs have reduced commercialization lag—“the length of
time between receipt of a patent and F.D.A. approval”—and they are
much more lucrative for pharmaceutical companies because they enjoy
monopoly status longer. 141
On average, accounting for the time it takes to gain FDA
approval, the effective patent term of first-in-class drugs is twelve-anda-half years, entitling them to a mere 62.5 percent of their patent
term. 142 For this reason, many “compounds are never developed [into
drugs] because the patent protected production time available to
recoup the cost of development is too short.” 143 IPRs risk further
limiting patents’ average effective term of market exclusivity—
particularly if the proceedings target secondary patents that help add
extensions to patent terms. Accordingly, pharmaceutical firms expect
to have reduced time within which to recoup their investment, leading
to fewer promising compounds being developed.
A large pharmaceutical company that acquires a drug from a small
firm is in a much better position to forecast the effective life of its
primary patent than the small firm was when it undertook discovery
research. This is because the commercial lag between acquisition and
approval is necessarily shorter than the commercial lag between
discovery and approval. Also, the VCs that invest in discovery-research
companies “may be more impatient than neo-classical models [of
profit-maximizing behavior] would predict due to . . . agency
problems” 144 that are the result of informational asymmetries between
management and investors; these asymmetries are at their greatest
when a drug’s therapeutic potential is merely theoretical. 145
Furthermore, because of the time value of money, small increases
in the risk profile of a project exponentially discount the present value
of its future cash flows, especially those that are the most remote—
those furthest upstream in the innovation pipeline. According to many
patent brokers, the sale price of American patents has been reduced by

140. See id. (“To secure F.D.A. approval . . . drug companies race the clock to show that their
product is safe and effective.”).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
144. Budish et al., supra note 137, at 2045.
145. See infra Part II.B.
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two-thirds since the establishment of IPR proceedings. 146 Even if the
future value of VC-funded primary patents has been reduced by a mere
fraction of this amount, the present value of such a patent is worth an
order of magnitude less when discounted to present value. The risk that
IPRs create for pharmaceutical patents, then, may be felt most acutely
far upstream. And upstream is exactly where looming risks carry the
most catastrophic consequences, as that is where breakthrough
therapeutic innovation typically occurs. 147
C. If It Ain’t Broke . . .
Long before the advent of IPR proceedings, drug patents were
already subject to specialized review. More than three decades ago,
Congress, through the Hatch-Waxman Act, 148 devised an expedited
litigation pathway for challenging pharmaceutical patents. 149 The
Hatch-Waxman Act sought both to incentivize innovation and to
facilitate the entry of cheaper generic drugs into the marketplace. 150
And by most accounts, it has been successful in doing so. 151 Although
generic drugs made up only 19 percent of prescriptions in 1984, they
made up 88 percent of prescriptions by 2015. 152 Furthermore, by 2015,
the average cost of a generic drug was less than one-fifth of the price
of a patented brand drug. 153
146. Richard Baker, Guest Post: America Invents Act Cost the US Economy Over $1 Trillion,
PATENTLY-O (June 8, 2015), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/america-invents-trillion.html
[https://perma.cc/TM84-UWP8].
147. See infra Part II.B.
148. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
149. The Hatch-Waxman Act does not apply to biologics or biosimilars, which are instead
covered by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”). 42 U.S.C. § 262.
150. See 130 CONG. REC. 24,425 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (“[T]he bill . . . assures
consumers of more low-cost generic drugs when a valid patent expires and the drug industry of
sufficient incentive to develop innovative pharmaceutical therapies.”); see also Michael A. Carrier
& Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–14
(discussing the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act); Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance:
The Conflict Between Hatch-Waxman and Inter Partes Review, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT.
L. 14, 16 (2016) (“With Hatch-Waxman, Congress sought to achieve a delicate balance between
stimulating innovation from brand companies who hold patents and facilitating market entry from
generic companies who challenge the patents.”).
151. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 150, at 13 (“On the whole, the Hatch-Waxman Act has
been successful.”).
152. Id.
153. Id.; see IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, MEDICINES USE AND SPENDING IN
THE
U.S.: A REVIEW OF 2015 AND OUTLOOK TO 2020, at 27 (2016),
https://morningconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IMS-Institute-US-Drug-Spending-
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To encourage investment in new drugs, the Hatch-Waxman Act
provides for “a patent-term extension for patents relating to certain
products that were subject to lengthy regulatory delays and could not
be marketed prior to regulatory approval.” 154 It also seeks to encourage
generic drug manufacturers to enter the marketplace. 155 The HatchWaxman Act introduced the Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”), 156 which allows the manufacturers of bioequivalent
generic drugs to rely on the safety and efficacy data submitted by the
brand drug manufacturer when it sought FDA approval. 157
Importantly, the Hatch-Waxman Act gives generic drug
companies a significant incentive to challenge drug patents prior to
their expiration. If a generic drug company wishes to market a generic
version of a drug before the Orange Book patents covering that drug
expire, it must file a certification under 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), known as a Paragraph IV certification. 158 The
Hatch-Waxman Act promotes the early resolution of patent disputes
between generic and brand-name pharmaceutical companies by
specifying that the mere act of filing a Paragraph IV certification
constitutes an act of patent infringement. 159 Furthermore, “to
incentivize ANDA filers to challenge the validity of listed patents or
design around those patents as early as possible, the Hatch-Waxman
Act provides that the first ANDA applicant to file a Paragraph IV
certification . . . [will] enjoy a 180-day period of generic marketing
exclusivity.” 160 Significantly, the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer
obtains a 180-day, or six-month, exclusivity period regardless of
whether it establishes that the brand name manufacturer’s “OrangeBook-listed patents are invalid or not infringed by the drug described

2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JTG-J39E] (comparing branded drugs’ average list price with generic
drugs’ average list price).
154. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990).
155. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 14–15 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647; see
Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 396 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Act has two
general purposes: (1) to increase the availability of low-cost drugs . . . and (2) to further encourage
new drug research . . . .”).
156. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
157. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 676.
158. See id. at 677 (discussing Paragraph IV certification).
159. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2); see Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678 (“[An] act of infringement . . . consists
of submitting an ANDA . . . containing the fourth type of certification . . . .”).
160. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)).
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in its ANDA.” 161 This six-month period of generic exclusivity can be
extremely profitable, allowing Paragraph IV challengers to price their
drug at a cost that is only slightly less than that of the branded drug.162
The data demonstrates the strength of this incentive: “81 percent of
drugs facing generic entry in 2012” faced Paragraph IV challenges. 163
The IPR regime has also created a new and surprising threat:
hedge funds. In 2014, a hedge fund manager named Kyle Bass, along
with one of his fund’s subsidiaries—the Coalition for Affordable Drugs
(“CFAD”)—entered the fray and made IPR challenges even more
perilous for pharmaceutical companies. 164 Bass developed a scheme to
reap enormous financial rewards by shorting stock in a pharmaceutical
company and then petitioning to have one of that company’s important
drugs invalidated in IPR proceedings. 165 On February 10, 2014, Bass
filed IPR petitions challenging the validity of Ampyra, a prescription
drug that helps multiple sclerosis patients walk. 166 The shares of
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., the company that owned these patents,
dropped nearly 15 percent in the days that followed, 167 allowing Bass’s
hedge fund to turn a fast profit by shorting the stock, 168 notwithstanding
the fact that the PTAB ultimately upheld the patents’ validity. 169 In the
months that followed, CFAD filed thirty-two more IPR petitions, all
of which challenged patents in the biotechnology space. 170
Bass has claimed that his repeated IPR petitions were designed to
bring down drug prices, asserting that “Medicare and U.S. consumers
pay the ultimate price for the evergreening of bad patents by the
pharma cabal.” 171 Although Bass and his hedge fund appear to have
161. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb)).
162. Shepherd, supra note 150, at 24 (noting that the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer “can earn
substantial profits by shadow pricing, or pricing slightly under the innovator’s price”).
163. Id.
164. See Nolan & Martinez, supra note 57, at *2 (suggesting that “the mere filing of the
petition—and not its underlying merits—caused the [company’s stock price to drop ten
percent]”).
165. Id.
166. Jennifer Robichaux Carter, Hedge Funds Should Be Able to Challenge Patent Validity
Using Inter Partes Review Despite Mixed Motives, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1315, 1317–18 (2017).
167. See id. (explaining that the stock price dropped 9.7 percent on February 10 and then 4.8
percent on February 27, for a total 14.5 percent drop from the original price).
168. Id. at 1330.
169. Coalition For Affordable Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., No.
IPR2015-00817 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2015).
170. Carter, supra note 166, at 1332–33.
171. Susan Decker, Bloomberg, Dallas’ Kyle Bass Blames Big Pharma ‘Cabal’ for Lost Fights
Over Drug Prices, DALL. NEWS (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/health-
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moved away from filing new IPR petitions, 172 the threat to
pharmaceutical companies still remains. Biotech companies are
particularly vulnerable to IPR challenges filed by hedge funds and
short sellers “because—in contrast to most high-tech companies—
biotech companies often rely on just a handful of highly valuable
patents to protect their products and massive investment therein.” 173
Hence, the mere filing of an IPR can drastically impact the stock prices
of these companies. 174
Fighting a war on two fronts is costly and expensive. HatchWaxman and PTAB proceedings can force drug companies to fight
validity battles in two ways, potentially eviscerating the financial
incentives necessary to ensure robust drug-development efforts. It has
been suggested that life science patents should be exempted from IPR
challenges since Congress, through the Hatch-Waxman Act, has
already established effective mechanisms for challenging such
patents. 175 Leaders in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
have argued that
the IPR process threatens to disrupt the careful balance that Congress
achieved over 30 years ago, by increasing business uncertainty for
innovative biopharmaceutical companies having to defend their
patents in multiple venues and under differing standards and
procedures, ultimately diverting finite resources away from the
research and development of new cures and treatments, to the
detriment of patients. 176

Given that Congress has so far shown no real interest in exempting
life sciences patents from IPR challenges, however, an alternative
solution is instead for drug companies and Native American tribes to
form partnerships in a manner that can effectively shield
care/2017/04/10/dallas-kyle-bass-blames-big-pharma-cabal-lost-fights-drug-prices
[https://
perma.cc/BFJ5-54GX].
172. See id. (noting that “[t]he coalition hasn’t file a new case in 18 months”).
173. Sauer Testimony, supra note 99, at 18.
174. Id. at 1.
175. See Letter from James C. Greenwood, President & CEO of BIO, and John J. Castellani,
President & CEO of PhRMA, to Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., Patrick
Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm., Robert Goodlatte, Chairman, House
Judiciary Comm., John Conyers, Ranking Member, House Judiciary Comm. (July 15,
2015)
[hereinafter
Greenwood
Letter],
http://thehill.com/sites/default/files/
final_joint_phrma_bio_letter_on_ipr_071515.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCV8-LDCA] (arguing that
the “Hatch-Waxman Act and the BPCIA already allow for generic and biosimilar companies to
effectively challenge patents that are perceived as overly broad or invalid”).
176. Id.
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biopharmaceutical patents from IPR review, as seen in Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. 177
III. ALLERGAN AND THE ST. REGIS TRIBE SHOULD ENJOY
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Federal Circuit and the PTAB erred in determining that tribal
sovereign immunity is inapplicable to the St. Regis Tribe’s patents in
IPR proceedings. Their decisions mischaracterize the nature of an IPR
proceeding as an administrative enforcement action, conflict with
Supreme Court precedent, and fail to recognize that a congressional
directive to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity must be unequivocal.
Moreover, from a public policy point of view, these decisions fail to
analyze the agreement from the Tribe’s perspective, and gloss over the
significant non-monetary benefits it will bring to the St. Regis
community.
A. Similarly Flawed Legal Reasoning: The Federal Circuit and the
PTAB
On July 20, 2018, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion
erroneously concluding that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply
to IPRs in Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals. 178 In
doing so, the panel relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s analysis in
FMC. 179 The Mylan court determined that “[g]enerally, [sovereign]
immunity does not apply where the federal government acting through
an agency engages in an investigative action or pursues an adjudicatory
agency action.” 180 The panel did concede that “IPR is neither clearly a
judicial proceeding instituted by a private party nor clearly an
enforcement action brought by the federal government.” 181 It also
acknowledged Supreme Court precedent that sovereign immunity is
applicable during administrative adjudications between private
parties. 182 The panel, however, ultimately determined that “IPR is
more like an agency enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 1326 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002)).
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1326–27.
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private party,” and thus concluded that “tribal immunity is not
implicated” in IPR proceedings. 183
The panel’s decision is problematic for a number of reasons,
providing a strong rationale for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
First and foremost, the panel erred by failing to give sufficient weight
to the many marked similarities between IPR proceedings and
ordinary civil litigation. In an IPR proceeding, the private-party
petitioner controls the claims challenged and the grounds of the
attacks, much like a civil plaintiff who makes particularized
allegations. 184 Indeed, an IPR cannot commence until the petitioner
serves the patent owner with a petition, in line with civil service of
process. Moreover, the PTAB has no authority to begin a proceeding
without a private party’s petition. 185 And neither the PTAB nor the
PTO Director is a party to the proceeding. 186 To the contrary, the
petitioner brings forth the evidence 187 and carries the burden of
establishing unpatentability. 188 Moreover, the PTAB must decide the
case based on the “arguments that were advanced by a party.” 189
Notwithstanding these, and legion other similarities to civil
adversarial proceedings, the panel justified its nonadversarial
assignation by relying on the fact that the PTAB can issue a decision
even if the petitioner withdraws. 190 But even this reasoning is flawed;
significantly, the PTAB’s authority to issue a decision after the
withdrawal of the petitioner is very narrow. By statute, an IPR
proceeding must “be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon
the joint request of the petitioner and the patent owner, unless the
[PTO] has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for

183. Id. at 1327.
184. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018) (“Congress chose to structure a[n
IPR] process in which it’s the petitioner, not the [USPTO] Director, who gets to define the
contours of the proceeding.”).
185. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(5) (2012).
186. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2018) (defining “Party” as “at least the petitioner and the patent
owner and, in a derivation proceeding, any applicant or assignee of the involved application”).
187. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (providing that a petition will only be considered if it identifies,
inter alia, “the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”).
188. Id. § 316(e) (“In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner shall
have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the
evidence.”).
189. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
190. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“Once IPR has been initiated, the Board may choose to continue review even if the petitioner
chooses not to participate.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 317(a))).
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termination is filed.” 191 Thus, the PTAB can issue a decision following
the withdrawal of the petitioner only if the PTAB has already reached
a determination on the merits of the case. This is far different from an
agency adjudicative action that is “commenced and prosecuted” by the
United States, 192 like an SEC enforcement action for violating federal
securities laws. 193
A second problem with the Federal Circuit’s holding in Mylan is
that it conflicts with SAS Institute v. Iancu, 194 where the Supreme Court
specifically stated that an IPR is a “procedure allow[ing] private
parties to challenge previously issued patent claims in an adversarial
process before the Patent Office that mimics civil litigation.” 195 Given
that SAS Institute characterized IPRs as “party-directed, adversarial”
proceedings 196 with “many of the usual trappings of litigation,” 197 it is
difficult to see how the Federal Circuit felt justified in concluding that
“IPR is more like an agency enforcement action than a civil suit
brought by a private party.” 198
Finally, the panel’s Mylan holding is flatly inconsistent with the
Federal Circuit’s previous decision in Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of
University of Missouri. 199 In Vas-Cath, the court recognized that
sovereign immunity can apply to administrative patent proceedings
and pointed to a number of elements—such as the presence of “adverse
parties, examination and cross-examination by deposition of
witnesses,” and “findings by an impartial federal adjudicator”—that
determine when an administrative proceeding “can indeed be
characterized as a lawsuit.” 200 To wit, all of these elements are
indisputably present in an IPR proceeding. 201 In sum, sovereign
immunity should attach in an IPR proceeding because such a
191. 35 U.S.C. § 317(a).
192. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (“A suit which is commenced and
prosecuted against a State in the name of the United States . . . differs in kind from the suit of an
individual . . . .”).
193. See Securities Act, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2018).
194. SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
195. Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1354.
198. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
199. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
200. Id. at 1382.
201. See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016-01274, -01275, 01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *8 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (describing arguments between patent
owner and petitioner on how inter partes review is similar and dissimilar to civil litigation).
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proceeding “walks, talks, and squawks very much like a lawsuit”
between private parties. 202
Like the Federal Circuit, the PTAB also erred when it concluded
that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to IPR proceedings. 203
The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that a tribe, like the St.
Regis, is entitled to invoke sovereign immunity unless Congress has
“unequivocally” expressed its desire to abrogate this immunity. 204
Nothing in the AIA or its legislative history even remotely suggests
that tribal immunity should not apply in IPR proceedings. With this
lack of any congressional directive, and with the Supreme Court’s
determination that a tribe’s “baseline” condition is immunity from
suit, 205 the PTAB had no reasonable justification for refusing to grant
the St. Regis Tribe’s motion to terminate IPR proceedings.
The power of an administrative agency like the PTAB “is
circumscribed by the authority granted” by Congress. 206 As several
prominent scholars, including Erwin Chemerinsky, have argued, the
PTAB “has no expertise or experience that would enable it to secondguess prima facie assertions of tribal sovereign immunity.” 207 The
PTAB’s “statutory jurisdiction over IPRs is limited to challenges based
on prior art and obviousness” whereas tribal-immunity issues “involve
sensitive legal questions that are far different from the patent issues
that Congress has charged the [PTAB] with resolving.” 208 From an
institutional-competency perspective, the PTAB is simply not the right
body to evaluate the legitimacy of the contract between Allergan and
the St. Regis Tribe. According to one commentator, the PTAB’s
“sweeping” determination that tribal sovereign immunity does not
apply in IPR proceedings is “the latest and possibly most extreme
example of agency overreach in the seven-year history of the PTAB
under the [AIA].” 209
202. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 757 (2002) (citation omitted).
203. Mylan, 896 F.3d at 1325.
204. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030–31 (2014).
205. Id. at 2031.
206. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944).
207. Brief of Amici Scholars in Support of Patent Owner the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe at 12,
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Brief
of Scholars] (including Erwin Chemerinsky, Laurence H. Tribe, Joseph William Singer, and
William N. Eskridge in the undersigned scholars).
208. Id.
209. Josh Malone, Controversy Over Restasis Patents is Misplaced, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 21,
2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/21/controversy-restasis-patents-misplaced/id=94904
[https://perma.cc/Q32G-TPEM].
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The PTAB’s decision that the St. Regis Tribe had no right to assert
immunity was particularly unjustifiable given that it has repeatedly
allowed states to use sovereign immunity to protect patents from IPR
challenge. 210 In NeoChord, Inc. v. University of Maryland, 211 the PTAB
dismissed an IPR proceeding against both a state university and the
private entity that had licensed the university’s patents. 212 The PTAB
held that sovereign immunity barred suit against the state university,
and that the suit could not proceed without the state university because
it was an indispensable party. 213 In concluding that the state university
was an indispensable party, notwithstanding that it had licensed its
patents, the PTAB focused on the fact that the state university had not
transferred “substantially all” of its rights to its licensee because, like
the St. Regis Tribe, the university retained the right to practice the
patent, the right to royalties, and the right to respond to legal action in
the event the licensee failed to do so. 214
The PTAB should have applied this same analysis to the
transaction between Allergan and the St. Regis Tribe. Pursuant to the
agreement between the parties, the St. Regis Tribe was given the “first
right to sue for infringement unrelated to such Generic Equivalents.” 215
Furthermore, although Allergan was given the sole right to use the
patents in the production of drugs, the St. Regis Tribe retained the
prerogative to use the patents for research, academic use, and in the
care of patients, so long as it developed products that did not compete
with Allergan’s. 216 Most significantly, the Tribe received an initial
payment of $13,750,000 and quarterly royalties of $3,750,000 from
Allergan. 217 Because the Tribe had a very substantial financial interest
in the Restasis patents, as well as the right to use and enforce the
patents under certain circumstances, it was an indispensable party, and
thus the PTAB had no reasonable basis for concluding that the IPR
proceedings could proceed without the Tribe’s participation.
210. Examples of such challenges include: Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No.
IPR2016-01914, 2017 WL 2992429 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017); NeoChord, Inc. v. University of
Maryland, No. IPR2016–00208 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017); and Covidien LP v. University of Florida
Research Foundation Inc., Nos. IPR2016-01274, -01275, -01276 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).
211. NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., No. IPR2016–00208 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017).
212. Id. at 2.
213. Id. at 18–19.
214. Id. at 19.
215. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, -01128, -01129, 01130, -01131, -01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *3 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam).
216. Id. at *10–11 (quoting Exhibit 2087 § 2.1).
217. Id. at *12.
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The PTAB determined that there was no controlling precedent
requiring the application of tribal immunity in IPR proceedings, 218 and
that granting states sovereign immunity did not require a similar grant
to Native American tribes. 219 But considered together, these holdings
are insidiously circular and misleading. First of all, IPRs were only
created in 2012, so the lack of precedent is unsurprising. But more
importantly, the PTAB’s assertion regarding state sovereign immunity
fails to mention that in Covidien LP v. University of Florida Research
Foundation Inc., 220 the entity granted immunity was a state university’s
research foundation that licensed intellectual property to generate
revenue—meaning that its purpose was to monetize innovation, much
like a pharmaceutical company. 221 There is little substantive difference
between the university foundation in Covidien and the St. Regis Tribe
in the Restasis proceedings; both accepted assignment of patents in
order to generate revenue through royalties and licensing agreements.
Consequently, to deny the Tribe’s right to assert its sovereign
immunity, “would constitute improper unequal treatment and
discrimination against the Tribe.” 222 Furthermore, even assuming,
arguendo, that there was no precedent directly addressing whether
tribal sovereign immunity applies in IPR proceedings, the PTAB
should have looked to the Supreme Court’s consistent and sympathetic
treatment of tribal sovereign immunity for guidance. 223
B. Policy Considerations Also Demonstrate Why Sovereign
Immunity Should Apply
Some commentators have asserted that Allergan’s partnership
with the St. Regis Tribe violates the public pledge by Allegan’s CEO,
Michael Saunders, to keep drug prices more transparent and
affordable to patients. 224 This argument is unpersuasive. As Saunders
218. Id. at *3.
219. Id. at *4.
220. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, -01275, -01276
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).
221. Id. at *3; University of Florida Research Foundation, OFF. RESEARCH: UNIV. OF FLA.,
https://research.ufl.edu/ufrf.html [https://perma.cc/H688-YQXH].
222. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Oglala Sioux Tribe in Support of Corrected Patent Owner’s
Motion to Dismiss Based on Tribal Sovereign Immunity at 12, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe, IPR Nos. 2016-01127, -01128, -01129, -01130, -01131, -01132, 2018 WL 1100950
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
223. See supra Part I.B and accompanying text.
224. See Sy Mukherjee, Botox Maker Allergan’s CEO Defends Selling Drug Patents to Native
(Sept.
9,
2017),
American
Tribe
to
Thwart
Rivals,
FORTUNE
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correctly contends, Allergan’s partnership is not at odds with its “social
contract,” a core feature of which “is a focus on innovation and
research to help patients.” 225 He argues that Allergan is not “trying to
artificially extend” the Restasis patents, but instead is “just trying to
protect [its] property against a system that exposes [it] to double
jeopardy.” 226 Saunders also points out that there have been many
instances of hedge funds demanding cash in exchange for not filing IPR
challenges, and that “Allergan has been the target of one of these
extortion-like attacks.” 227 If our system is to let more entities take
cheap(er) shots at branded pharmaceutical companies through IPRs, it
is fitting that those companies be allowed to take some additional
protections, like the helmet of sovereign immunity.
What most commentators fail to analyze is the rationale for the
agreement between Allergan and the St. Regis Tribe from the Tribe’s
perspective. The St. Regis Tribe’s contract with Allergan is an integral
part of its “economic development plan,” not merely some “scheme
[designed] to shield patents from review.” 228 As a direct consequence
of its agreement with Allergan, the St. Regis Tribe, as sovereign, passed
a resolution “endorsing the creation of a technology and innovation
center for the commercialization of existing and emerging
technologies.” 229 To flippantly conclude that this arrangement is a mere
“sham,” as many commentators have done, is to disregard the Tribe’s
very legitimate reasons for entering into this contract. 230 And to
criticize Allergan for engaging in a “rent-a-tribe” scheme trivializes not
only the multimillion-dollar arrangement, but also a sovereign nation’s
right to act in its own interests. 231 The PTAB’s effective nullification of
the contract between Allergan and the Tribe needlessly and illegally

http://fortune.com/2017/09/09/allergan-drug-patents-native-american
[https://perma.cc/U7K3456G] (detailing patient advocates’, generic drug makers’, and biotech investors’ concern with the
St. Regis arrangement, particularly in light of the “social contract” Saunders promised to patients
for fair and transparent prices).
225. Id. (quoting Saunders).
226. Id. (quoting Saunders).
227. Brent Saunders, Reverse Patent Trolls Are Harming Drug Innovation—and Patients,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2017, 2:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/reverse-patent-trolls-areharming-drug-innovationand-patients-1507487600 [https://perma.cc/VX2K-NR8R].
228. Brief of Scholars, supra note 207, at 12.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 13 (noting petitioner’s argument that the Allergen/Mohawk agreement is a
sham).
231. See id. (noting petitioner’s argument that the Allergen/Mohawk agreement is a “rent-atribe” scheme).
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injects the PTO into a “politically charged inquiry into tribal
motivations and the policy wisdom of tribal economic freedom.” 232 Put
another way, the assertion here is that St. Regis Tribe’s sovereign
immunity can be extricated from its current dalliance with
pharmaceutical patents—it cannot, for the two are inextricably
intertwined.
One of the primary goals of the federal government’s policy
toward Native American tribes is “to render Tribes more selfsufficient,” making them better able to finance “sovereign functions,
rather than relying on federal funding.” 233 To date, however, efforts to
promote tribal economic growth have proved inadequate. For more
than half of reservations, “some of the highest poverty and
unemployment rates in the nation remain the norm.” 234 In the words of
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, “[i]f Tribes are ever to become more selfsufficient, and fund a more substantial portion of their own
governmental functions, commercial enterprises will likely be a central
means of achieving that goal.” 235 As such, developing innovative “tribal
business operations [is] critical to the goals of tribal self-sufficiency
because such enterprises . . . ‘may be the only means by which a tribe
can raise revenues.’” 236
The St. Regis Tribe found a very creative and very lucrative means
to generate much-needed revenue when it entered into its partnership
with Allergan. Since Congress has not unequivocally expressed its
desire to abrogate immunity in this situation, 237 both the PTAB and the
courts must therefore respect the Tribe’s decision to invoke tribal
sovereign immunity and shield the Restasis patents.
The PTAB declared that “[e]ven assuming arguendo that the
Tribe is entitled to assert immunity,” the IPR could proceed because
Allergan is the “effective patent owner.” 238 Although this

232. Id.
233. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
234. Ablavsky, supra note 78.
235. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2041 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 2043 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity
and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 169 (2004)).
237. Id. at 2031; see also C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532
U.S. 411, 418 (2001).
238. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, -01128, -01129, 01130, -01131, -01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *7, *13 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (emphasis added).
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pronouncement sounds profound, it “has no legal meaning” 239 or
statutory validation. The St. Regis Tribe is the sole owner of the
patents. To allow the IPR to proceed without the St. Regis Tribe could
be a violation of due process: no congressional authorization exists
permitting “effective” patent owners to litigate on behalf of actual
owners. Moreover, as Allergan points out, no unity of interest exists
between the partners: “Allergan can practice the inventions in the
patents whether or not they are valid but the Tribe’s property rights
and right to payments from Allergan would be extinguished if the
Appellees prevail in the IPRs.” 240
The Federal Circuit has held that “a patent should not be placed
at risk of invalidation by the licensee without the participation of the
patentee.” 241 The Restasis patents are certainly at risk here, yet the
PTAB continues to rely on its self-created “effective owner”
designation in order to reach its desired result. However, as Allergen
and the St. Regis Tribe detail, no statute authorizes the PTAB to
conduct an IPR “against an effective patent owner in the absence of
[an] ‘actual owner’” who is immune from suit. 242
The AIA is clear that the right to participate as a defendant in an
IPR proceeding is held by the patent owner. 243 Nowhere is an “effective
owner” mentioned in the statute. 244 Because “effective” patent owners
are not granted standing in the AIA, and standing in administrative
proceedings is governed by statute, 245 the PTAB’s determination that
it “may proceed with an ‘effective’ patent owner exceeds its statutory
authority.” 246 Allowing PTAB judges this degree of ad hoc rulemaking
authority would be contrary to the administrative structure that
Congress created.
In spite of the legitimacy of the St. Regis Tribe’s contract with
Allergan, for which millions of dollars of valuable consideration was
exchanged, the PTAB felt it could treat Allergan, rather than the St.

239. Appellants’ Motion for Stay Pending Review at 11, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan
Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-1638).
240. Id. at 11–12.
241. Schwarz Pharm., Inc. v. Paddock Labs, Inc., 504 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
242. Matthew Bultman, Tribe Asks Fed. Circ. To Pause Restasis Patent Reviews, LAW360
(Mar. 19, 2018, 6:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1023523/tribe-asks-fed-circ-to-pauserestasis-patent-reviews [https://perma.cc/HL54-AYTF].
243. 35 U.S.C. §§ 313, 314(c), 315(a)(8)–(9) (2012).
244. See text accompanying supra note 243.
245. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
246. Appellants’ Motion for Stay Pending Review, supra note 239, at 13.
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Regis Tribe, as the patent owner. However, it was the St. Regis Tribe
litigating this case, and it will be the St. Regis Tribe appealing the case
going forward. In terms of basic contract law, parole evidence—
evidence existing outside of the text of the contract—can only be
considered if there are defects in the written instrument. 247 No one
claims that such defects are present here. It is surprising, then, that the
PTAB felt it was within its rights to go “under the hood” of the plain
language of the St. Regis–Allergan contract. In so doing, the PTAB
effectively invalidated a legitimate contract based on its perception of
a sovereign entity’s intent, determining that the presumption of patent
ownership created by an assignment was rebutted by extrinsic
evidence. 248
CONCLUSION
The patent system no longer effectively incentivizes investment in
new and improved drug therapies. Lost in the cacophony surrounding
the debate about high drug prices is the fundamental principle that
pharmaceutical innovation will not occur without the prospect of
outsized returns enabled through market exclusivity. And while the
IPR system may sensibly eliminate low-quality patents in certain
industries, it has the potential to derail critical investment in the
biotechnology industry. VCs, who enable much of the disruptive
innovation in the pharma space, rely most heavily on the signaling
value of patents in early rounds of financing where therapeutic
potential is greatest. 249 IPR proceedings have upended the delicate
balance that Congress struck in the Hatch-Waxman Act, and in doing
so, they have “increas[ed] business uncertainty for innovative
biopharmaceutical companies having to defend their patents in
multiple venues and under differing standards and procedures.” 250
These proceedings are diverting finite resources away from the
research and development of new cures and treatments. The patent
system may thus be “applying an unintended downward pressure on
the incentives to undertake the most risky [and fruitful] research.” 251
247. Parol Evidence Rule, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
parol_evidence_rule [https://perma.cc/3KBY-ASKK].
248. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, -01128, -01129, 01130, -01131, -01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *13 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
249. See Hoenen et al., supra note 112, at 982 (finding that “patent activity before the first
round of financing increases the capital invested in a firm”).
250. Greenwood Letter, supra note 175.
251. Cahoy, supra note 133, at 87.
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For a myriad of reasons, the pharmaceutical industry is different,
incurring far more in R&D costs than any other industry in order to
produce products that are easily copied at a fraction of the price.
In a recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Orrin Hatch, for
whom the Hatch-Waxman Act is named, questioned whether PTAB
proceedings “are impacting [the] Hatch-Waxman [Act] in a
disproportionate way.” 252 The fact that Allergan felt compelled to
“sell” its patents to the St. Regis Tribe provides strong evidence that
PTAB proceedings are doing just that. The beleaguered
pharmaceutical industry is being squeezed on all sides. It costs drug
manufacturers an estimated average of $2.6 billion to bring a new drug
to market. 253 And these costs are only increasing. Yet, the expected
value of a drug’s patent portfolio is decreasing, thanks to the significant
likelihood that some or all patent claims will be invalidated by the
PTAB. Moreover, branded manufacturers are forced to fight a war
against generics on two fronts, concurrently defending their patents in
district court and before the PTAB, each under differing evidentiary
standards. All the while, such firms must contend with hedge funds
exploiting the IPR system, specifically targeting life sciences companies
because they are so vulnerable. Such ills are only compounded by a
shrinking R&D pipeline and by VCs deciding to move their life
sciences capital abroad. 254 Is it any wonder that Allergan turned to the
St. Regis Tribe for help?
Allergan does not contend that its patents are beyond review. Nor
is its partnership with the St. Regis Tribe an exploitation of the IPR
regime. Rather, this partnership is a response to exploitation. Far from
the “sham” or “rent-a-tribe” scheme narrative pushed by the media
and commentators, 255 Allergan’s alliance with the St. Regis Tribe is a

252. Scott Graham, Skilled in the Art: The Brave New World of Section 101 Guidance,
LAW.COM (Apr. 20, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/04/20/skilled-in-the-art-the-bravenew-world-of-section-101-guidance [https://perma.cc/2XGJ-6797] (quoting Andrei Iancu,
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, in response to prodding by Senator
Orrin Hatch).
253. Mullin, supra note 85.
254. See Madigan, supra note 117 (“[T]he National Venture Capital Association . . .
highlight[s] a drop [in the US share of global venture capital] from 83% of global share in 1996 to
just 54% in 2015.”).
255. Roy Schestowitz, A Sham and a Scam: How Patent Extremists Continue to Promote a
Mohawks and Allergan Ploy Against PTAB, Even After Oil States, TECHRIGHTS (May 14, 2018,
12:31 AM), http://techrights.org/2018/05/14/watchtroll-for-allergan [https://perma.cc/QRX25FHG]; see also, e.g., Robert Pear, Indian Tribe Joins Big Pharma at the Supreme Court,
Defending a Lucrative Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/
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justified effort to obtain reprieve from an IPR regime that is inherently
unsuited to pass judgment on dearly acquired patent rights. In that
sense, the alliance is an innovative, legitimate, and appropriate use of
tribal sovereign immunity.

us/politics/allergan-eye-drops-indian-tribe.html [https://perma.cc/R2JS-SSB8] (portraying this
narrative).

